Date: For Parliament Sitting on 3 February 2026

Name and Constituency of Member of Parliament

Mr Gabriel Lam, Sembawang GRC

Questions

Mr Gabriel Lam: To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether MAS has plans to further review the Guidelines on Shared Responsibility Framework, in particular, banks’ responsibility for unauthorised digital transactions that occur within seconds despite fraud alerts to customers; and (b) whether existing rules adequately require banks to halt or reverse fraudulent transactions when customers report them promptly.

Mr Gabriel Lam: To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Ministry is reviewing the current real-time fraud detection standards expected of financial institutions in Singapore; and (b) if so, whether stronger real-time verification standards will be mandated.


Answer by Mr Gan Kim Yong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry, and Chairman of MAS:

1. 79% of scam cases as at first half of 2025, involved self-effected or authorised transfers rather than unauthorised transactions. In these cases, scammers deceive victims into initiating and authenticating the transactions themselves. We have also seen phishing scam cases where scammers tricked victims to disclose their account credentials and subsequently manipulated them to authenticate fraudulent transactions on their banking app.

2. Banks continually sharpen their fraud detection systems to sift potentially fraudulent transfers. They also perform step-up authentication for flagged transactions, by suspending such transactions or requiring additional confirmation from customers. Distinguishing self-effected transactions that were induced by deception, from legitimate self-effected transactions, is not an easy task even for sophisticated fraud detection systems. A substantial number of flagged transactions are ultimately legitimate, underscoring the complexity of fraud detection and the trade-off between security and convenience.

3. The fraud surveillance duty under the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) is aimed at a scenario where there is rapid draining of significant account balances. Banks are required to block or hold such transactions for at least 24 hours to allow customers time to review the fund transfers and decide if they should proceed. This has already caused some inconvenience to legitimate transactions; the Member may refer to the written reply given in this House on 4 November 2025   on how MAS and banks have worked to minimise disruptions to legitimate transactions. We need to strike a balance between protecting the users while avoiding inconvenience to the vast majority of customers. 

4. Banks send real-time notifications of online funds transfers to customers and will put in best efforts to recall the funds after being notified of a fraudulent transfer as soon as possible. This may not always be successful as scammers may move funds quickly between many accounts by then. Nevertheless, banks are expected to promptly suspend further transactions from the customer’s account when the customer reports a fraudulent transaction. Customers can also activate a kill-switch themselves to suspend their accounts. In assessing customers’ claims for compensation, banks must consider if they have fulfilled their obligations, including under the SRF, and whether the victim has acted responsibly, including reporting fraudulent transactions promptly. 

5. Even as banks continually enhance their systems and safeguards, combatting scams requires a whole-of-society approach. We urge consumers to exercise vigilance and heed advisories issued by Government agencies. Consumers can also take steps to protect themselves by setting lower limits for transaction notification and funds transfer, as well as making use of MoneyLock, which allows them to set aside funds which cannot be digitally accessed.